AD + Log4shell + Windows Startup
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@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
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- [Alternatives - modules](#alternatives---modules)
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- [Using Mimikatz DCSync](#using-mimikatz-dcsync)
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- [Using Mimikatz sekurlsa](#using-mimikatz-sekurlsa)
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- [Crack NTLM hashes with hashcat](#crack-ntlm-hashes-with-hashcat)
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- [Password spraying](#password-spraying)
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- [Kerberos pre-auth bruteforcing](#kerberos-pre-auth-bruteforcing)
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- [Spray a pre-generated passwords list](#spray-a-pre-generated-passwords-list)
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@@ -675,6 +676,8 @@ Requirements:
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#### samAccountName spoofing
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> During S4U2Self, the KDC will try to append a '\$' to the computer name specified in the TGT, if the computer name is not found. An attacker can create a new machine account with the sAMAccountName set to a domain controller's sAMAccountName - without the '\$'. For instance, suppose there is a domain controller with a sAMAccountName set to 'DC\$'. An attacker would then create a machine account with the sAMAccountName set to 'DC'. The attacker can then request a TGT for the newly created machine account. After the TGT has been issued by the KDC, the attacker can rename the newly created machine account to something different, e.g. JOHNS-PC. The attacker can then perform S4U2Self and request a TGS to itself as any user. Since the machine account with the sAMAccountName set to 'DC' has been renamed, the KDC will try to find the machine account by appending a '$', which will then match the domain controller. The KDC will then issue a valid TGS for the domain controller.
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**Requirements**
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* MachineAccountQuota > 0
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