- [SCF and URL file attack against writeable share](#scf-and-url-file-attack-against-writeable-share)
- [Passwords in SYSVOL & Group Policy Preferences](#passwords-in-sysvol-&-group-policy-preferences)
- [Exploit Group Policy Objects GPO](#exploit-group-policy-objects-gpo)
- [Find vulnerable GPO](#find-vulnerable-gpo)
- [Abuse GPO with SharpGPOAbuse](#abuse-gpo-with-sharpgpoabuse)
- [Abuse GPO with PowerGPOAbuse](#abuse-gpo-with-powergpoabuse)
- [Abuse GPO with pyGPOAbuse](#abuse-gpo-with-pygpoabuse)
- [Abuse GPO with PowerView](#abuse-gpo-with-powerview)
- [Dumping AD Domain Credentials](#dumping-ad-domain-credentials)
- [Using ndtsutil](#using-ndtsutil)
- [Using Vshadow](#using-vshadow)
@@ -690,31 +695,68 @@ Get-NetGPOGroup
> Creators of a GPO are automatically granted explicit Edit settings, delete, modify security, which manifests as CreateChild, DeleteChild, Self, WriteProperty, DeleteTree, Delete, GenericRead, WriteDacl, WriteOwner
:warning: Domain members refresh group policy settings every 90 minutes by default but it can locally be forced with the following command: gpupdate /force.
GPO are stored in the DC in `\\<domain.dns>\SYSVOL\<domain.dns>\Policies\<GPOName>\`, inside two folders **User** and **Machine**.
If you have the right to edit the GPO you can connect to the DC and replace the files. Planned Tasks are located at `Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks`.
:warning: Domain members refresh group policy settings every 90 minutes by default but it can locally be forced with the following command: `gpupdate /force`.
* Have a very long password for your accounts with SPNs (> 32 characters)
* Make sure no users have SPNs
@@ -1570,7 +1629,7 @@ This ACE can be abused for an Immediate Scheduled Task attack, or for adding a u
#### ReadLAPSPassword
An attacker can read the LAPS password of the computer account this ACE applies to. This can be achieved with the Active Directory PowerShell module.
An attacker can read the LAPS password of the computer account this ACE applies to. This can be achieved with the Active Directory PowerShell module. Detail of the exploitation can be found in the [Reading LAPS Password](#reading-laps-password) section.
@@ -1705,16 +1764,22 @@ ls \\machine.domain.local\c$
> The user sends a TGS to access the service, along with their TGT, and then the service can use the user's TGT to request a TGS for the user to any other service and impersonate the user. - https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html
> When a user authenticates to a computer that has unrestricted kerberos delegation privilege turned on, authenticated user's TGT ticket gets saved to that computer's memory.
:warning: Unconstrained delegation used to be the only option available in Windows 2000
Domain Compromise via DC Print Server and Unconstrained Delegation
#### SpoolService Abuse with Unconstrained Delegation
The goal is to gain DC Sync privileges using a computer account and the SpoolService bug.
Prerequisites:
- Object with Property "Trust this computer for delegation to any service (Kerberos only)"
- Must have ADS_UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
- Must not have ADS_UF_NOT_DELEGATED flag
- Object with Property **Trust this computer for delegation to any service (Kerberos only)**
- Must have **ADS_UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION**
- Must not have **ADS_UF_NOT_DELEGATED** flag
- User must not be in the **Protected Users** group
- User must not have the flag **Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated**
@@ -1738,9 +1813,11 @@ Monitor incoming connections from Rubeus.
Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:1
```
#### Force a connect back from the DC
##### Force a connect back from the DC
> SpoolSample is a PoC to coerce a Windows host to authenticate to an arbitrary server using a "feature" in the MS-RPRN RPC interface
Due to the unconstrained delegation, the TGT of the computer account (DC$) will be saved in the memory of the computer with unconstrained delegation. By default the domain controller computer account has DCSync rights over the domain object.
> SpoolSample is a PoC to coerce a Windows host to authenticate to an arbitrary server using a "feature" in the MS-RPRN RPC interface.
```powershell
# From https://github.com/leechristensen/SpoolSample
* [CVE-2020-17049: Kerberos Bronze Bit Attack – Practical Exploitation - Jake Karnes - December 8th, 2020](https://blog.netspi.com/cve-2020-17049-kerberos-bronze-bit-attack/)
* [CVE-2020-17049: Kerberos Bronze Bit Attack – Theory - Jake Karnes - December 8th, 2020](https://blog.netspi.com/cve-2020-17049-kerberos-bronze-bit-theory/)
* [Kerberos Bronze Bit Attack (CVE-2020-17049) Scenarios to Potentially Compromise Active Directory](https://www.hub.trimarcsecurity.com/post/leveraging-the-kerberos-bronze-bit-attack-cve-2020-17049-scenarios-to-compromise-active-directory)
* [GPO Abuse: "You can't see me" - Huy Kha - July 19, 2019](https://pentestmag.com/gpo-abuse-you-cant-see-me/)
netlocalgroup"Backup Operators"hacker/add# Full access to files
netgroup "Domain Admins"hacker/add/domain
# enable a domain user account
netuserhacker/ACTIVE:YES/domain
# prevent users from changing their password
netuserusername/Passwordchg:No
# prevent the password to expire
netuserhacker/Expires:Never
```
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